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Abstract
Regulating the labor market to increase job security is just one possible way of
addressing workersdemands for income protection against labor market risks. By
acknowledging that other policies can be used to address the same political demand,
this paper develops a simple framework to understand rms preferences towards
labor market regulation visavis a system of unemployment benets, which can be
understood as a political substitute. Two key empirical implications of the theoretical
argument are tested and corroborated with data on ring costs and the generosity of
the unemployment insurance system from OECD countries and the rest of the world.
First, there seems to be a relation of substitution between the cost of ring and the
generosity of unemployment subsidies across countries. And second, countries with
more volatile economic conditions seem to prefer the latter policy to the former.
1 Introduction
The existence of labor market regulations has been traditionally interpreted as the
result of either the political power of organized labor, as in the traditional power-
resources literature (Esping-Andersen 1990, Pagano and Volpin 2001) or, in the more
recent varieties of capitalism approach (Hall and Soskice 2001, Estevez-Abe et al.
2001), as an institutional device used by rms in coordinated market economies to
secure workersinvestments in rm- or industry-specic skills. This paper proposes
a di¤erent logic in which both labor demands for protection against labor market-
associated risks as well as context-dependent rms policy preferences jointly explain
the emergence of labor market regulation.
This paper concurs with the power resourcesmain proposition that labor market
protection policies, either in the form of regulations that directly a¤ect the costs of
hiring and ring for employers, or in the form of social policies that indirectly a¤ect
the functioning of the labor market such as the establishment of a system of subsidies
for those unemployedare the result of political demands from workers facing labor-
market related risks. This assumption is largely consistent with historical accounts of
the emergence of labor market institutions (Agell 2002), which emphasize precisely
the role played by the new forms of unemployment brought about by the economic
transformations of the 19th century. Unemployment, compounded by the erosion of
traditional institutions of risk sharing, was what sparked the rst modern demands
for labor market regulation policies.1 In principle, therefore, labor market regulation
policies emerge as a demand of workers. Without such political demand from those
1"The observation that the origin of modern labour market institutions can be traced to periods
of rapid change and modernisation, and to the aftermath of economic crisis," he writes,"is quite
consistent with a social insurance interpretation of the birth of institutions. More generally, the
lesson seems to be that peoples demand for intervention to mitigate risk can be expected to increase
in times of greater uncertainty" (Agell 2002: 9).
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who su¤er the risk of unemployment, labor market regulation will seldom emerge, as,
in principle, rms inherently benet from the freedom to hire and re as their market
conditions change.
The fact that the demand for labor market protection originates in workers does
not imply that an anaysis of the relative political power of this group is su¢ cient
to explain the emergence of the specic policies, such as labor market regulation,
implemented to address that demand. We will argue that rmspreferences towards
labor-market protection policies are key to understanding these policies. As workers
care only about ends, not means, and labor market regulation is only but one policy
aimed at satisfying these ends, politiciansresort to this policy tool (as opposed to
other alternatives, most notably the establishment of a public unemployment insur-
ance system) will happen not only when workers are powerful enough to obtain a
certain degree of labor protection, but when, additionally, labor market regulation is
preferred by employers to other policy alternatives that could be used to address the
same political demand.
As we will show, when choosing between the di¤erent ways of addressing workers
demands, namely, between labor market regulation2 and the use of a universal system
of transfers to compensate workers falling into unemployment, rms face a trade-o¤.
They must choose between solving the collective action problem they run into when a
system of unemplyment transfers is in place, and insuring themselves against the risk
of exogenous demand shocks and being unable to get rid of portions of their labor
force. While labor market regulations, by increasing the costs of ring, help rms solve
the collective action problem, a universal unemployment insurance system protects
them against the latter concern i.e. the risk of su¤ering poor demand conditions in
2Although labor market regulation is in fact made up of many other di¤erent dimensions, in the
context of this paper, labor market regulation is meant to imply merely the presence of ring costs.
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the future.
The collective action problem consists in that, whenever workers are strong enough
to obtain from the government welfare compensation for the unemployed, individual
rms will not internalize the costs that ring excess workers creates for the whole
economy these layo¤s must be paid for through social security contributions. The
ring of excess labor under a system of transfers creates a net ine¢ ency: provided the
productivity of every worker is always positive, it is always better to keep a worker
on the job than to subdisize her in exchange for nothing. Labor market regulations,
by increasing the cost of ring workers for individual rms (through a more generous
severance pay, typically), force employers to internalize this cost. As a result, fewer
workers will end up unemployed and ine¢ ciently subsidized.
The attractiveness of the solution to this collective action problem has to be
weighed against the cost that high ring costs imposes on rmshire-and-re exi-
bility, which turns out to be especially valuable under conditions of high exposure to
shocks. The main argument of the paper is that, depending on the degree of exposure
to shocks, employers will lean towards one type of policy over the other. As work-
ers are always indi¤erent between certain combinations of these two policies (higher
ring costs or more generous unemployment subsidies), employerspreferences will
become determinant in explaining the choice of di¤erent labor market policies by
governments.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We rst discuss the logic
of substitutability between the two labor market policies: regulation in the form of
ring costs versus unemployment benets. Section three analyzes employersprefer-
ences toward these policies in di¤erent contexts. Finally, section four presents some
preliminary evidence that seems to corroborate the validity of the main arguments of
the paper. A nal summarizing section concludes.
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2 Labor demands and the capitalistsdilemma
We start by assuming that there are two relevant actors in the economy: capital
and labor. Workers only want to secure a stable ux of income, but face labor-
market related risks. As a result, they are attracted by any policy that reduces their
exposure to these risks, or o¤ers them monetary compensation in case of falling into
unemployment.3
Firms, on the other hand, want the total opposite: they prefer a very exible
labor market in which they can re and hire with as much discretion as possible,
and at the lowest economic cost. The reason is simply that the very existence of
these policies, oriented to protect labor, imposes a net liability on employers. Given
these preferences, whenever workers are politically weak and employers dominate the
political process, we should not observe either of these policies.
Whenever workers are politically powerful to push for some kind of protection
against labor-market related risks, a range of di¤erent policies are available to meet
those demands. Let us see in a bit of detail what the consequences of two typical
alternatives are for employers.
One rst and obvious way of addressing workers demands is through the cre-
ation of a public-based system of unemployment insurance. In such a system, social
security contributions paid for by employers nance the monetary transfers that work-
ers receive when they are unemployed. This policy, however, creates economy-wide
ine¢ encies as employers face a collective action problem when deciding how many
workers to re. Let us see why.
3Others (Saint-Paul 2000, Boeri et al. 2004) have modelled the emergence of di¤erent labor
market policy-equilibria as the consequences of divisions within the labor force, most notably between
unskilled vs. skilled workers, and insiders vs. outsiders. We abstract from these divisions, and
exploit instead the di¤erent preferences that employers might develop towards labor market policies
in di¤erent contexts.
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In a world without social security transfers, rms should only keep employed
workers whose productivity is higher than her wage.4 But if the unemployed do not
lose their salary (because they get unemployment transfers that substitute for their
wage), then it is always e¢ cient to keep their workers on their job, as idle workers are
by denition less productive than employed workers (provided that their productivity
is always positive). The problem is that rms cannot commit themselves not to re
their own excess of labor once the economic burden of subsidizing an individual worker
who is out of the job is not borne out by the individual rm that red her, but rather
shared by all rms in the economy.5 In short, a public program of unemployment
transfer makes ring ine¢ ciently cheap from an individual standpoint, which gives
rise to an ine¢ cient pool of unproductive subsidized workers.
To see this more clearly, it is useful to think of an economy consisting of a single
rm. If that rm has to pay unemployment transfers to all workers that are unem-
ployed, it will always choose to have all workers employed in the rm, because in
that case the employer gets at least something in exchange for the monetary transfer
he makes to all members of the labor force. It is in this sense that the existence
of unemployment transfers are invariably ine¢ cient: once a monetary transfer to a
worker is made, it is always better to have her employed in a rm than unemployed.
In sum, rms should always collectively prefer to protect workers against labor mar-
ket risks by keeping them employed than by transferring them money when they are
unemployed.
As the use of unemployment transfers targeted to the unemployed is an ine¢ cient
way of addressing the workers demands, it would seem that their mere existence o¤
the equilibrium pathwould secure workersjobs by making it attractive to rms to
4Recall that in the logic of our argument, this will occur only when labor is politically weak.
5Specically, by all social-security tax-payers.
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Table 1: The CapitalistsCollective Action Problem
Firm B
Fire Not Fire
Fire 1,1 3,0
Firm
A
Not re 0,3 2,2
always employ them, and workersconcerns about job security would be successfully
satised. But employers face a collective action problem: although they would be
all better-o¤ by keeping their workers in their jobs when a system of unemployment
transfers is in place, individual rms have an incentive to deviate from the collectively
optimal strategy, and will re all workers whose wages are above their productivity.
Table 1 represents the prisoner dilemma-like strategic situation that employers con-
front when they happen to have an "excess of labor."
Although, as discussed earlier, rms are collectively better-o¤ by not ring any
worker and thus avoiding the ine¢ ciencies generated by unemployment transfers (2,2),
both rmsdominant strategy is to re its excess of labor. Whether the other rm
keeps its excess of labor or not, it is always best to re ones own: in the former case,
to externalize the costs of the rms excess of labor; in the latter, to avoid subsidizing
other rmslayo¤s. If both players play their dominant strategies, they end up in the
suboptimal situation of ine¢ cient unemployment (1,1), the typical result of standard
Prisoners-dilemma games.
As a result, the establishment of a system of unemployment benets to satisfy
workersdemands produces ine¢ cient results for employers: workers would get pro-
tection from labor market-associated risks, but collective action problems make cap-
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italists incur deadweight losses.
One evident policy alternative that might be used to satisfy workersdemands is
to o¤er them labor market regulation. To overcome the collective action problem,
labor market regulation must translate to individual rms the costs of paying idle
workers, so that ring becomes less attractive for them. The usual form of this type
of policy is the introduction of a severance pay that the employer must redeem to
every employee she res.
For employers, this institutional solution, in contrast with the system of unemploy-
ment transfers, involves no collective action problem and, accordingly, no ine¢ ciencies
for the collectivity (but, as we discuss in the next section, this will not imply that it
will be always desirable). The collective action problem vanishes because employers
now cannot externalize the cost of compensating redundant workers: under a sev-
erance pay-based scheme, each rm must pay for the social cost of its unemployed.
Layo¤s now will occur not when wages are above productivity as before,6 but when
wages plus the cost of the severance pay are above productivity. Put di¤erently, ring
becomes less attractive to employers and, accordingly, it will be used less often. The
reduction in layo¤s reduces the e¢ ciency cost created by the existence of paid idle
workers.7 In short, a system of employment protection based on the institutionaliza-
tion of severance pay solves the collective action problem that employers face when
they try to commit to their collective preferred solution (not to re any worker) under
a system of unemployment subsidies.
How would workers react to this alternative policy? In principle, workers might
see this policy as a substitute for the existence of unemployment benets. There are
6It is assumed that the cost of the transfer for an individual rm is neglible under an universal
unemployment insurance system.
7In the limit, when severance pay equals innity (i.e. when there is total job protection), idle
paid labor force equals zero, and the ine¢ ciencies we were referring to disappear completely, just as
in the case of a one-rm economy discussed above.
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two reasons for this: rst and foremost, the two are monetary substitutes: it must be
necessarily the case that, for some value of the severance pay, workers are indi¤erent
between this payment and a given unemployment monthly benet. Second, if they
value job stability per se (i.e. beyond monetary considerations), as long as they are
aware that a system based on labor market regulation solves the employerscollective
action problem, workers might nd this solution more attractive, as it de-incentivates
layo¤s, by making themmore costly to individual rms. In short, workersindi¤erence
curves towards these two alternative policies should look like the ones shown in Figure
1.
Figure 1: Workers Indi¤erence Curves (Higher Curves=Higher Utilities Imply
Stronger Power of Labor)
Severance pay
Unemployment transfers
The graph represents the idea that workers are willing to trade generosity of
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the unemployment transfer scheme for higher amounts of compensation in the form
of severance payments. Certainly, labor always wants more of the two policies so
that indi¤erence curves further to the right yield more utility to workers. But their
power resources will determine how much they get in the aggregate. If workers are
politically weak, they will only be able to reach those indi¤erence curves close to
the origin. As their political leverage increases, they can reach higher-utility curves,
in the direction indicated by the arrow. In any case, however, for a given level of
workerspolitical strength, they will be indi¤erent between combinations of the two
types of labor market protection policies that represent movements along the same
indi¤erence curve.8
Given this structure of workersinterests and the di¤erent policies that could be
used to addressed their demands, the next task is to understand rmspreferences
towards di¤erent combinations of policies that render workers indi¤erent (that is,
points along a single indi¤erence curve).
3 Choosing over policies: the role of shocks
Although increasing the cost of ring may seem to be, according to the previous
discussion, the best option for rms (so that they can avoid nancing an ine¢ cient
public unemployment transfers system), it has also detrimental side-e¤ects on capital.
Employment protection policies impose nontrivial losses on the degree of exibility
rms enjoy in the management of their workforce. As the severance pay rises, it is
8Although Boeri et al. (2004) and Algan and Cahuc (2005) make a case also for a negative
relationship between unemployment generosity and the cost of ring, they propose however di¤erent
explanations. Briey, Boeri et al develop a model of conicting preferences over these policies
between di¤erent types of workers. In their model, as employment protection regulation benets
low-skilled insiders, this policy will arise only in economies with compressed wage structures. Algan
and Cahuc, on the other hand, argue that the unemployment subsidies model, which they associate
with the Danish system, is only available for countries with high levels of public spiritedness in which
individual workers will not cheat on the universal unemployment insurance system.
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more costly to individual companies to dismiss redundant workers and thus the excess
of labor they may have to bear in the workplace increases. In short, the presence of a
job protection system curtails companiesfreedom in adjusting their human resources
to di¤erent economic circumstances.
These exibility costs associated with labor regulations, however, are not the
same across economies. In relatively stable economies where future market terms
are fairly well known, employers will be more able to take their hiring decisions in
accordance with their production plans so that the expected excess of labor (and
the cost of regulation) will be small. On the contrary, when the economy is very
unstable and exposed to abrupt changes in demand or in other market conditions,
rms will be worse at forecasting their future labor demand and therefore the risk of
supporting a large number of redundant workers will be higher. When the likelihood
of su¤ering a very negative shock is high enough, they may prefer to reduce the
degree of regulation so they can re unnecessary employees at a lower cost even if
that implies more unemployment security in the form of higher replacement rates.
As discussed before, to solve the collective action problem, rms agree to introduce
an individually-paid sanction (the severance pay) that makes employers internalize
the social cost of their layo¤ choices. By increasing ring expenses, unemployment
shrinks and so does the ine¢ ciency caused by the need to subsidize idle workers.
Yet, addressing workers demands through a company level protection scheme implies
that rms must bear unilaterally the costs of negative shocks: they will have to cope
with the structure of economic risks by themselves. Under very volatile economic
conditions, and assuming employers are risk averse, capital may nd it enormously
expensive to respond to labor requests in this way.
Publicly supported unemployment transfers may be, under some circustances, an
optimal institutionalized instrument for dealing with company-associated risks when
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workers ask for some kind of protection. Since all employers contribute to nancing
unemployment subsidies, this income replacement program may be conceived as an
insurance employers buy to protect themselves against eventual negative shocks. In
other words, instead of each rm bearing the whole cost of its redundant workers
during bad conditions, a system of public transfers to compensate the unemployed
makes it possible to pool risks and to share the burden of ring workers among rms
(as long as the severance pay is subsequently cut down).9 We argue below that
the attractiveness of this protection policy increases with the degree of exposure to
exogenous shocks.
Putting all pieces together, when facing a strong labor, capital has to choose
between resolving a collective action problem and protecting itself against production
risks. This is what the capital dilemma consists of. The nal combination of policies
capital o¤ers to workers will depend upon the structure of risks they face. As the
probability of confronting strong negative shocks increases, a system of unemployment
transfers becomes more desirable to employers compared to labor regulations. When
production is subjected to a higher degree of volatility, it is harder to determine the
future needed level of employment within rms and so the likelihood of holding a great
number of superuous employees may rise accordingly. As a result, they may prefer
pooling risks together through a system of unemployment transfers and be freer to
re when necessary. Solving the problem of collective action turns out less attractive
relative to providing insurance (that is, sharing the burden of the unemployed) when
economic perspectives are very unstable.
In more formal terms, suppose that the distribution of shocks has a normal density
function f(x) with zero mean and standard deviation . We interpret the argument
9Mares (2003) develops a similar argument to explain variability in rmssocial policy preferences
as a result of di¤erent market conditions.
11
of the function, that is the particular shock x, as the change in the labor demand
associated with the shock. A positive value of x means that rms are exposed to an
exogenous positive shock and thus they will need more workers. Negative values of
x, on the other hand, indicate the occurrence of bad shocks generating a certain level
of unnecessary employees. Therefore, the expected excess of labor (EEL) is merely
a weighted sum of all negative xs where the weights are equal to the probability of
each negative shock:
EEL =
0Z
 1
f(x)  xdx+
1Z
0
f(x)  x0dx
=
0Z
 1
f(x)  xdx
The second term in the previous equation is equal to zero since all companies
facing good conditions (positive changes in their labor demand x) will not have to
reduce their workforce and so we equate positive values of x as a zero excess of labor.
Thus, the expected excess of labor corresponds to the mean of the negative part of the
x distribution (when shocks are negative and there exists in fact redundant workers).
To see more clearly how the degree of economic volatility a¤ects the cost of labor
market regulations from the capital viewpoint, imagine two economies (A and B)
characterized by di¤erent dispersion levels of their shocks distributions as shown in
Figure 2. Consider rst the less volatile economy A, represented by the solid curve.
This curve represents the distribution of shocks that each employer faces under a
relatively stable economy. The area below the curve measures the density of occurring
a shock associated with a certain change in the labor demand x, indicated in the
horizontal axis.
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Figure 2: Shocks and Changes in Labor Demand in Two Economies
0
Change in labor demand
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Economy A
(low volatility)
Economy B
(high volatility)
Suppose that the mean of this distribution is zero, that is, rms expect on aver-
age identical economic conditions to the previous period so that their labor demand
are the same and they do not have to modify in any direction the number of their
workforce. However, after the realization of shocks, some employers will experience
favorable market conditions (positive x) while others will go through a period of eco-
nomic recession (negative x). Although labor market regulation is valued di¤erently
ex-post by rms only those confronting bad shocks prefer lower ring costs as they
need to adjust downward their sta¤-, ex-ante the cost of regulation is the same for
all employers since they do not know if they will confront good or bad shocks.
To determine regulation costs, employers look at the expected excess of labor for
a particular distribution of shocks. In economy A, this is given by the solid vertical
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Figure 3: Shocks and Excess of Labor
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line of Figure 3. The expected excess of labor corresponds, as indicated before, to the
left-side mean of the shock distribution (those experiencing negative shocks). Since
Figure 3 represents excess of labor in the horizontal axis (instead of change in the
labor demand), that part of the shock distribution (negatives x) is drawn on the
positive side of the excess of labor distribution.
Now consider a more unstable economy (B), represented by the dash curve in
Figure 2. The greater standard deviation of its distribution of shocks, compared to
country A, means that the probability of very negative and positive shocks occuring
has increased. This higher economic volatility is translated, as indicated by the
dash line of Figure 3, into a higher expected excess of labor. Hence the cost of
regulation rises with the degree of volatility in the economy. Under this structure
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of risk, company-level employment protection where individual rms must bear an
increased burden of the superuous workforce becomes a very risky lottery. As capital
is assumed to be risk averse, they will be more willing to reduce the severance pay
and favor an income protection policy where all employers contribute to subsidize
unemployed workers.10
4 Data Analysis
We divide the empirical tests into two parts. First, we evaluate whether the logic
of substitutability between the two policies can be detected in the data. More pre-
cisely, we analyze whether, for similar levels of labor power, there exists a negative
association between the strictness of labor market regulations and the generosity of
the unemployment insurance scheme. Secondly, we develop an index of labor mar-
ket policy preference for each country based on our data on these two policies, and
try to explain the observed variation in this index as the result of the theoretical
explanations we have put forward in the previous section.
4.1 Testing for indi¤erence curves
In order to analyze whether, for a given strength of labor, there is in fact a trade-
o¤ between the use of ring costs and unemployment benets as means to protect
against labor market risks, we need data both on the employerscosts of ring workers,
and about the generosity of unemployment compensation programs. For the rst
indicator, we rely on a survey of labor market regulations conducted by the World
10These prediction for the business sector as a whole are in line with Mares(2003) expectations
for preferences over social policies at the rm level. She argues (and nds supporting evidence)
that high-risk rms prefer more universal social policies, whereas low-risk producers prefer instead
policies of social protection characterized by a lower redistribution of risks across sectors.
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Bank Group in 2005.11 Based on this survey, the World Bank calculates the costs of
ring a standard worker measured in weeks of wages.
For our second variable (the generosity of the unemployment insurance scheme),
we rely on two indicators. For OECD countries, we create an index of "unemploy-
ment benets generosity" based on high-quality data on social expenditures, taken
from the OECD Social Expenditure database. We calculate the 1990-2000 average of
unemployment compensation spending as a percentage of GDP and divide it by the
proporion of unemployed over the same period in each country. High values of this
index, therefore, imply a higher proportion of the GDP dedicated to unemployment
compensation per unemployed. For non-OECD countries for which similar and com-
parable data exist, we use a somewhat less reliable "unemployment coverage index"
developed from the comprehensive Boteros et al. (2004) global database on labor
market regulations. From that database, we use the percentage of the net salary
covered by the net unemployment benets in case of a one-year unemployment spell
(normalized, from 0 to 1), for countries in which the social security system covers
the risk of unemployment. For countries in which unemployment insurance is not
included in the social security system, our "unemployment coverage index" takes the
value of 0.
Figure 4 plots the relationship between ring costs and the generosity of unem-
ployment compensation using the data for OECD countries. The graph suggests the
existence of a negative relationship between the cost of ring (the severance pay mea-
sured in the number of weeks of wages), and the generosity of the unemployment
insurance (measured as the total spending in unemployment benets divided by the
unemployment ratio in the 1990s). However, this graph should be hiding the exis-
11Details about the survey and its methodology can be found in the
Private Sector Resources section of the World Bank Group website:
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/HiringFiringWorkers/
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Figure 4: Firing Costs and Unemployment Benets in OECD Countries
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tence of several indi¤erence curves as the ones represented in Figure 1. In fact, when
we di¤erentiate between countries with high and low levels of labor power,12 one can
easily note that, as expected, workerspolitical leverage is related with imaginary
indi¤erence lines further away from the origin.
Figure 5 plots the same relationship, but for the global sample, using the unem-
ployment coverage index instead of the OECD unemployment generosity indicator. A
similar picture emerges, although less neatly: the points tend to gather in the south-
west corner (as the negative slope of the indi¤erence curves would indicate), and
12The labor power index is also taken from the Botero et al. database (2004). See the Appendix to
see how this index has been constructed. We use the mean value of the distribution to di¤erentiate
countries in terms of the political strength of their labor.
17
Figure 5: Firing Costs and Unemployment Transfers. Global Sample
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countries in which labor is politically more powerful seem to lie in welfare-superior
indi¤erence curves.13
To test more rigorously for the idea that labor power should move the negative
correlation between ring costs and social security transfers towards the north-east,
we regress the level of ring costs on an indicator of labor power and an index of the
13One possible reason why countries with a politically strong working class are not always in higher
indi¤erence curves, as shown in Figures 4 and specially 5, is that there may be other context-specic
variables a¤ecting the desirability of labor protection policies in the rst place. Belot (2007), for
instance, argues that the demand for labor protection is partly a function of the geographical mobility
of labor. This explains, in her view, the di¤erent preference for labor market policies between Europe
and the United States. In light of our argument, this may imply that the utility associated with
a particular indi¤erence curve changes across-countries so that they may have distinct indi¤erence
curve maps.
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Table 2: Dependent Variable: Firing Costs (Severance Pay Measured in Weeks of
Salary)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OECD Global OECD Global
Unemp. Generosity -97.42 -29.72 259.72 23.20
(-2.77) (-2.16) (2.86) (1.26)
Labor power 66.84 18.98 30.23 6.96
(2.84) (0.87) (1.52) (21.21)
Protection Comprehensiveness 182.09 106.61
(3.69) (4.06)
Protection Compre.*Un.Gen. -523.13 -91.81
(-3.68) (-3.80)
Constant 28.74 53.75 -77.61 6.93
(2.43) (5.01) (2.61) (0.47)
R2 .41 .04 .64 .21
N 22 82 22 82
Prob > F .01 .09 <.01 <.01
t-values in parentheses
generosity of the unemployment insurance system. The expectations are that the rst
explanatory variable should enter the regression with a positive sign while the latter
with a negative one. For OECD countries (model 1), we use the generosity index
described above. For the global sample (model 2), we use instead the unemployment
coverage index. The rst two columns in table 2 present the results.
While our indicator of labor power does seem to move the indi¤erence curve
in the north-eastern direction for OECD countries (the postive sign indicates that,
for a given value of the unemployment generosity, countries with higher values in
the labor power index tend to have higher ring costs), it does not work in the
global sample (the coe¢ cient, although positive, is not statistically signicant). Most
importantly, the coe¢ cient on the unemployment generosity variable is negative and
statistically signicant both in the OECD and in the global sample (even though
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models 1 and 2 use di¤erent indicators), corroborating the existence of a negative
relationship beteween the two labor protection policies. In OECD countries, for
instance, the severance pay increases by 9.7 weeks of salary for every 0.1 increase in
the level of generosityof the unemployment system (for instance, a change from the
American to the Australian level).
It could be argued that labor market regulations in the form of high ring costs
for standard workers are attractive to employees only insofar as these regulations ap-
ply to a large fraction of the labor force. In other words, if a signicant number of
workers are not a¤ected by the level of ring costs (because they cannot be considered
standard workers), then the policy of establishing high ring costs will become less
appealing for workers. The empirical implication would be that the negative rela-
tionship between ring costs and unemployment benets again, for a given degree
of labor powershould only show up when these ring costs cover a large proportion
of the labor force.14 To test for that possibility, we include (in models 3 and 4), an
indicator of the degree of segmentation of the labor market (protection comprehensive-
ness) taken also from the Botero et al.s (2004) database, which measures the extent
to which the benets of standard workers are extended throughout the labor force
(it ranges from 0 to 1, with low values meaning higher segmentation, see Appendix).
We interact this variable with the unemployment benets variable to see whether
the negative association between ring costs and the generosity of the unemployment
insurance scheme is in fact stronger at higher values of comprehensiveness we expect
the interacted variable to be negative and stastistically signicant. The coe¢ cients
of models 3 and 4 in Table 2 show that this is in fact the case in the two samples.
14The segmentation of the labor market is a phenomenon typical not only of countries with a
large informal economy. In some advanced countries, partial labor market deregulations have de
facto created a dual labor force. See Polavieja (2003) for a thorough analysis of the paradigmatic
case of Spain.
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Table 3: E¤ect of Unemployment Benets on Firing Costs (Measured in Weeks of
Wages) under Di¤erent Degrees of Labor Market Segmentation
Unemployment Benets
Predicted Values Marginal e¤ect
Low Medium High (t-values)
Labor OECD Segment. High 23.12 25.13 27.12 13.85 (0.42)
Market Segment. Low 68.28 45.01 21.75 -153.54 (-4.26)
Conditions Global Segment. High 55.19 50.41 45.62 -15.37 (-1.12)
sample Segment. Low 96.65 81.07 65.49 -50.26 (-3.32)
Medium, high and low stand for the mean and one s.d. above and below the mean
Interestingly enough, the inclusion of this control improves signicantly the overall
t of the model: the R2 increases from .41 and .04 to .62 and .21, respectively.
Interpreting the coe¢ cients in interactive models is not straightforward. To make
sense of their substantive implications, we use the coe¢ cients from models 3 and 4
to obtain the predicted values of the dependent variable (ring costs) under di¤erent
values of unemployment benets under segmented and non-segmented labor markets,
along with the marginal e¤ect of a one-unit change in the unemployment benet
variable under di¤erent values of the segmentation variable (labor power is kept xed
in its sample mean). These predicted values and marginal e¤ects are presented in
table 3.
As these numbers clearly show, a higher level of unemployment benets is asso-
ciated with signicantly lower costs of ring, both in the OECD and in the global
sample, but only when the segmentation of the labor market is low, that is, when
non-standard workers enjoy the same level of protection as standard workers. Mov-
ing from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean of
the unemployment benet variable reduces, on average, the cost of ring a standard
worker in 46.53 weeks of wages (in OECD countries), and 31.16 weeks, if we use the
global sample. If, on the contrary, the degree of protection enjoyed by a standard
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worker does not apply to other sectors of the labor force, the generosity of unem-
ployment benets is not related in any substantial way with the cost of ring (the
marginal e¤ect of a change in benets, as shown in the last column, is not statistically
di¤erent from zero).15
All in all, this evidence suggests that there is in fact a relation of substitutability
between the level of generosity of unemployment transfers and the cost of ring. Also,
and in line with our theoretical framework, this relation seems to be inuenced by
the political power of labor (at least in the OECD data), and by the degree to which
the protection a¤orded to standard workers by labor market laws are representative
of the general degree of workersprotection across the economy. The next task is to
explain why some countries choose to protect workers by labor market regulations,
while others prefer to use unemployment subsidies.
4.2 Shocks and the choice of employment protection
To analyze country preferences along the "labor market regulation vs. unemployment
protection" trade-o¤, we rst have to create our dependent variable. To do so, we
create an index of the relative preference for these policies. This index is given by
the following expression:
PREFi =
fi  mean(f)
sd(f)
  ui  mean(u)
sd(u)
where f stands for the cost of ring, and u for the value of the unemployment
generosity variable.
15Following the procedure suggested in Greene (2000: 326), the marginal e¤ect of unemploy-
ment benets at di¤erent values of the segmentation variable is equal to the regression coe¢ cient
of unemployment benets (1) plus the coe¢ cient of the interaction term (2) times the value of
segmentation. The variance of this marginal e¤ect is, according to Greene, V ar (1)+S
2V ar (2)+
2SCov (1; 2), where S is the particular value given to segmentation.
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The index simply subtracts the normalized value of the unemployment benet
variable from the normalized value of ring cost variable. Positive values of this new
index therefore represent a preference for ring costs as a way of protecting workers,
where negative values represent a relative preference for a system of unemployment
subsidies instead. Figures 6 and 7 show the distribution of this variable for OECD
countries and the global sample, respectively.16
Figure 6: Preference for Firing Costs vs. Unemployment Transfers, OECD Countries
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Sources: World Bank and OECD
16Note that we actually create two di¤erent preference indexes: one for the restricted OECD
sample, using the data on unemployment generosity from the OECD Social Expenditure database,
and another for the global sample, using the data of unemployment coverage from the Boteros et
al. database.
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After having dened the dependent variable, we want to test whether this policy
preference can be explained as a result of the volatility of shocks, as implied by our
theoretical discussion. Two indicators are used to operationalize this variable: the
volatility of growth (measured as the standard deviation of the growth rate from 1990
to 2000) and the degree of trade openness (the average of imports plus exports as
percentage of GDP during the same time-span),17 under the assumption that more
internationalized economies are more exposed to exogenous shocks.
In our baseline model, we include two additional controls. First, since developed
countries have less organizational constraints to set up comprehensive universal unem-
ployment schemes, we control for per capita income. Second, expectations of positive
shocks should move curves in Figure 2 to the right. This would in turn reduce the
expected excess of labor, making countries more prone to the use of ring costs vis-a-
vis unemployment transfers as a way to protect labor. Therefore, we expect GDP per
capita to have a negative coe¢ cient (greater preference for unemployment benets)
and growth to have a positive one (greater preference for ring costs). Model 1 in
Table 4 shows the OLS results for our baseline model for OECD countries.
All four covariatescoe¢ cients have the right signs, and are statistically signicant.
Economic backwardness and high rates of growth are associated with preferences
for ring costs. More important for our purposes, the two indicators of economic
volatility are negatively associated with the use of ring costs as a way of protecting
labor. Both growth volatility and economic internationalization, on average, tend to
make countries more likely to choose unemployment benets relative to ring costs.
In model 2 we include two additional controls. Following the previous discussion,
the existence of a segmented labor market that makes ring costs a less attractive
17These variables have been created using yearly data from 1990 to 2000, from the Penn World
Tables, version 6.1.
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Table 4: Dependent Variable: Preference for Firing Costs vs. Unemployment Trans-
fers, OECD Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BEL ex FIN ex
GDP per capita /1000 -.25 -.21 -.15 -.24 -.25 -.26
(-5.80) (-3.74) (-1.51) (-4.61) (-5.82) (-4.59)
Growth 58.54 66.11 55.19 49.67 61.20 60.27
(3.15) (2.90) (2.77) (3.23) (2.50) (2.60)
Growth Volatility -47.92 -45.63 -44.08 -45.93 -47.18 -53.20
(-2.33) (-2.10) (-1.64) (-2.56) (-2.26) (-1.48)
Openness -.03 -.03 -.02 -.02 -.03 -.03
(-4.34) (-4.26) (-3.10) (-3.46) (-2.74) (-3.98)
Export concentration -1.54
(-0.98)
FT Contracts 1.49
(0.84)
Employers Centralization .10
(0.16)
Govt ideology -.05
(-2.11)
Constant 6.73 5.00 4.12 9.05 6.74 6.93
(5.82) (2.35) (1.54) (6.84) (5.73) (1.64)
R2 .69 .70 .39 .76 .67 .68
N 22 22 18 21 21 21
Prob > F <.01 <.01 .08 <.01 <.01 <.01
t-values in parentheses
option for workers could be expected to lead to greater preferences towards the use
of unemployment benets. The coe¢ cient, however, points in the opposite direction,
but is not statistically signicant. Secondly, one could argue that less diversied
economies should be particularly concerned with the risks of exogenous shocks 
and would opt for systems of unemployment transfers accordingly. To test for that
possibility, model 2 includes a variable measuring the degree of export concentration18
of the economy, but no signicant e¤ect is detected. However, the inclusion of these
18This indicator is for 2001, as has been taken from the United Nations Conference for Trade and
Development. See Appendix for details.
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two variables a¤ects neither the coe¢ cients nor the statistical signicance of the four
basic covariates.19
Model 3 adds another control: the degree of institutional coordination of capital.
When capitalists are strongly coordinated, then a system of unemployment transfers
should be less costly for employers, since they can more easily solve the collective
action problem that this policy creates. We use an index developed by Kenworthy
(1999), only available for 18 OECD countries. This reduction in the number of cases
causes the coe¢ cient on growth volatility to lose some signicance. The coe¢ cient
for the coordination of capital, however, is largely insignicant.
Finally, in model 4 we evaluate whether the ideology of the government is related
with a particular policy preference.20 It does seem that for the 21 countries for which
available data on the ideology of government is available, a large proportion of left-
wing cabinet members is associated with a preference for unempolyment benets over
ring costs.
Figures 8 and 9 show the partial correlations of economic openness and growth
volatility with the dependent variable. An inspection of these graphs suggests that
maybe the Belgian case (in the economic openness plot) and the Finnish one (in the
growth volatility one) are driving the results for these two variables. Models 5 and
6 in Table 4 run the baseline model without one of these two countries, respectively.
The result for economic openness is robust to the exclusion of Belgium: the economic
openness variable remains negative and highly signicant. The result for standard
19There is another reason why export concentration could be associated with a preference for a
system of unemployment benets. If the ownership of capital is more concentrated in economies
specialized in one or a few exports, then solving the collective action problems created by a system
of unemployment benets would become easier.
20In principle, insofar as the government ideology variable can be interpreted as a measure of the
power of labor, we expected this variable to a¤ect positively ring costs in the rst set of regressions
(just as the labor power index included in Table 2). However, government ideology was not related
in any signicant way with ring costs in those regressions (not shown).
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Figure 8: Partial Correlation between Economic Openness and Preference for Firing
Costs
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volatility, in contrast, does seems to be a¤ected by the exclusion of Finland. The
t value for the growth volatility coe¢ cient drops to 1.48. Note however that the
coe¢ cient does not change signicantly in magnitude, and the lower signicance might
be due to the relatively small amount of variability in the growth volatility variable
in the remaining OECD countries. Within this group of countries, only Finland
exhibits a very high level of output volatility in the 1990s (a consequence of the
strong dependence of the Finnish economy on the Soviet market prior to the collapse
of the Communist bloc). Precisely because of this reason, we should expect Finland
to choose protection through unemployment benets exactly what we see in Figure
9.
After discussing the results for the OECD sample, we now analyze the results for
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Figure 9: Partial Correlation between Growth Volatility and Preference for Firing
Costs
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the global sample. Table 5 presents the results. As in the OECD table, we start
by running a baseline regression (model 1), with the four main covariates. Income
per capita, growth, and growth volatility are, as in the OECD subsample, correctly
signed and statistically signicant. Economic openness, in contrast, although cor-
rectly signed, is not statistically signicant.
Models 2 and 3 control for the e¤ect of export concentration, segmentation in the
labor market, and the degree of democracy. While no signicant e¤ect for either of
these variables can be detected, the magnitude and the signicance of the coe¢ cients
for growth, per capita GDP and growth volatility remain unaltered.
Summing up, we nd quite supportive results for our main argument: the two
variables aimed at capturing the degree of exposure to shocks of the economy do
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Table 5: Dependent Variable: Preference for Firing Costs vs. Unemployment Trans-
fers, Global Sample
(1) (2) (3)
GDP per capita/1000 -.14 -.13 -.14
(-8.41) (-6.89) (-4.36)
Growth 16.12 12.65 13.08
(2.72) (1.70) (1.71)
Growth Volatility -12.42 -10.08 -10.10
(-3.23) (-2.82) (-2.77)
Openness -.002 -.001 -.001
(-0.62) (-0.50) (-0.45)
Export concentration 1.44 1.42
(1.37) (1.32)
Segmentation .26 .33
(0.35) (0.39)
Democracy .01
(0.25)
Constant 1.70 1.15 1.08
(4.47) (1.93) (1.61)
R2 .49 .50 .50
N 80 71 71
Prob > F <.01 <.01 <.01
t-values in parentheses
seem to exert a positive impact on the preference for unemployment insurance-based
systems of labor market protection. The e¤ect of growth volatility is statistically
signicant both in the OECD and in the global sample. Trade openness, however,
seems to be robustly associated with such a policy only in the OECD sample. In
line with the theoretical expectations from the argument put forward in this paper,
when faced with labor demands for protection against labor market-related risks,
governments in economically volatile environments prefer to buy insurance against
exogenous shocks. In contrast, in countries less a¤ected by these exogenous shocks,
the solution to the collective action problem becomes more important in relative
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terms, and thus their governments opt for higher levels of labor market regulations,
in the form of high ring costs for individual rms.
5 Conclusions
This paper has advanced an explanation for preferences toward di¤erent types of
policies aimed at protecting workers against labor market risks. In this explanation,
the political power of labor determines the demand for protection, but because workers
are indi¤erent between di¤erent combination of policies that protect them equally
against such risks, power resources arguments alone cannot answer why some policies
are preferred in some contexts, but not in others.
To explain the choice between policies aimed at protecting labor, we have ar-
gued, an understanding of rmspreferences towards the di¤erent policy alternatives
that could be used to meet workerspolitical demands is crucial. When choosing be-
tween high ring costs or unemployment benets, rms must choose between insuring
themselves against the possibility that they might need to re some of their workers
and have to pay the cost of their unemployment, and solving the collection action
problem that a unemployment system entails. As prospective economic conditions be-
come more unpredictable, the value of the former vis-a-vis the latter should increase.
Therefore, we should observe a greater preference for systems based on transfers to
the unemployed in more open and volatile economies.
Although much more empirical work is needed to test systematically the hypothe-
ses that follow from this theoretical framework, preliminary evidence from the degree
of labor market regulation and the generosity of social security transfers in OECD
countries seems to roughly corroborate the most important conjectures: i) there is a
relation of substitution between the use of unemployment transfers and labor mar-
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ket rigidity for equivalent levels of labor strength, and ii) countriespreferences over
these policy tools depend upon the degree of exposure to exogenous shocks: countries
with higher levels of economic openness and greater income volatility tend to prefer
unemployment subsidies over labor market regulation, where the opposite seems to
be true for countries with higher levels of economic predictability.
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Appendix: Data Description
Denitions and Sources
Firing costs Cost of ring a standard worker measured in weeks of wages, 2005.
Source: World Bank. Details about the survey methodology can be found in
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/HiringFiringWorkers/Firing costs.
Unemployment benets generosity (OECD sample) Unemployment expendi-
ture (as % of GDP) divided by unemployment rate, 1990-2000. Source: OECD
Social Expenditure Database.
Unemployment coverage (global sample) Equals zero if the social security sys-
tem does not cover the risk of unemployment, and the percentage of the net
salary covered by net unemployment benets in the case of a one-year unem-
ployment spell, otherwise. Source: Botero et al. (2004).
Labor power Measures the statutory protection and power of unions as the average
of the following seven dummy variables which equal one: (1) if employees have
the right to unionize; (2) if employees have the right to collective bargaining; (3)
if employers have the legal duty to bargain with unions; (4) if collective contracts
are extended to third parties by law; (5) if the law allows closed shops; (6) if
workers, or unions, or both have a right to appoint members to the Boards of
Directors; and (7) if workerscouncils are mandated by law. Source: Botero et
al. (2004).
GDP per capita Per capita income, 1990-2000, measured in 1996 US dollars, con-
stant PPP. Source: Penn World Tables version 6.1.
Growth Economic Growth, 1990-2000 average. Source: Penn World Tables version
6.1.
Growth Volatility Standard deviation of the growth rate, 1990-2000. Source: Penn
World Tables version 6.1.
Openness Economic openness measured as imports plus exports as % of GDP.
Source: Penn World Tables version 6.1.
Export concentration Herndahl-Hirschmann export concentration index, rang-
ing from 0 to 100 (maximum concentration). Source: United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Handbook of Statistics, 2001.
Protection Comprehensiveness Measures the existence and cost of alternatives
to the standard employment contract, computed as the average of: (1) a dummy
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variable equal to one if part-time workers enjoy the mandatory benets of full-
time workers; (2) a dummy variable equal to one if terminating part-time work-
ers is at least as costly as terminating full time workers; (3) a dummy variable
equal to one if xed-term contracts are only allowed for xed-term tasks; and
(4) the normalized maximum duration of xed-term contracts. Source: Botero
et al. (2004).
Capital centralization Subjetive measure of business organization, combining the
degree of concentration among business organizations and the degree of cen-
tralized authority of confederations over their members (higher values: more
concentration). Source: Hicks and Kenworthy (1998).
Government ideology Mean of government ideology from 1945-97, based on party
manifesto data. Ranges from 0 (right) to 100 (left). Source: Kim and Fording
(2002).
Democracy A measure of the degree of democracy in a given country based on: (1)
the competitiveness of political participation; (2) the openness and competi-
tiveness of the chief executive recruitment; and (3) the constraints on the chief
executive. The variable is measured as the average from 1950 or independence
through 1995. Source: Botero et al. (2004) own calculations using the Polity
IV dataset.
Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max N
Firing Costs 54.17 42.78 0 176 85
Unemployment Benets (OECD) .23 .14 .06 .59 22
Unemployment Coverage (global sample) .28 .31 0 1 82
Labor Power .42 .18 0 .71 85
GDP per capita/1000 9.21 7.82 0.47 28.9 84
GDP Growth .017 .023 -.076 .073 83
Growth Volatility .039 .027 .008 .138 83
Economic Openness 70.12 40.89 15.03 321.13 84
Export Concentration .22 .14 .06 .67 76
Protection Comprehensiveness .61 .19 0 .97 85
Capital Centralization .48 .43 0 1 18
Government Ideology 52.20 8.76 41.34 75.61 22
Democracy 4.88 3.76 0 10 84
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